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Can Russia win its’ war in Chechnya?
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Russia’s two previous interventions into Chechnya between 1994 and the present day have proven costly in both financial terms and in human lives. Public confidence in the government’s actions has fluctuated wildly between staunch support and deep scepticism, to add to this the Chechen rebels have become increasingly radicalised by the conflict. But despite this the government of Vladimir Putin is still eager to continue the fight to bring a favourable end to the Chechen conflict. In answering the question of whether or not Russia can win the war this essay will begin by addressing the reasons behind Russia’s decision to intervene. These reasons have differed between the two wars, and this is reflected in the different methods and motivations adopted by the Russians in the two wars. For example Russia have, in the past, felt that Chechen leaders such as Aslan Mashkadov have been sufficiently moderate to offer a political solution to the conflict, at other times the predominant view has been one of a need for a war of annihilation. The successes and failures of these and other methods will be assessed along with the different tactics used by the Chechens across the wars. Examination of these factors should then provide a clearer answer to the question of whether Russia can win its war in Chechnya. The primary reason for Russia’s first move into Chechnya was the declaration of independence made by Dzhokar Dudayev. This secession was unacceptable to the Russian government for a number of reasons; firstly it could lead to a ‘domino effect’ in which other provinces in the region would follow, undermining the strength and influence provided to Russia by its size and diversity. The threat of a spread of secession was exaggerated by the fact that Chechnya is at the centre of an unstable region where ethnic Russians are in a minority. Secondly, Chechnya a key route for Russia’s oil and gas pipelines on which much of its natural wealth depends. Russia also wanted to unite its people under a new Russian identity following the collapse of the Soviet Union; Yeltsin had previously announced a desire to build a Russian identity based on civic, not ethnic lines . But the Chechen breakaway arguably provided a convenient location to build a shared identity through the patriotism of a perceived security threat. Initially Russian actions in Chechnya were covert and limited in size with the aim of supporting the local opposition to Dudayev. But this soon escalated with large numbers of Russian troops entering Chechnya to try and reintegrate the province into the Russian Federation through military means. This intervention was generally seen as a complete failure, Russian techniques were crude with disproportionate levels of force used against both rebels and civilians by poorly trained and coordinated Russian troops. This approach was characterised by indiscriminate shelling and bombing of targets such as Grozny in 1994-5 despite the presence of large numbers of innocent civilians. This approach may have been reasonably effective in strictly military terms but it also created new problems that would make winning the war much harder in future. For example Dudayev’s forces, realising they couldn’t defeat the Russians in direct military confrontation resorted to guerrilla tactics. This not only resulted in their ability to hide within civilian populations but also led to a steady death toll amongst Russian troops as they were caught in ambushes or by snipers within civilian areas. This led to a steady decline in Russian public confidence in the governments’ ability to successfully prosecute the war as well as large amounts of criticism from the international community at a time when Russia was keen on normalising relations with the West.
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